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ARTICLES
Is There a Place for Animals in the
Moral Consideration of Nature?

The compatibility of an "animal lib
eration" ethic and an environmental
eth ic depends prima ri lyon how one
interprets
the
meaning
and
moral
structu re of a theory of envi ronmental
ethics.
In part this is because the
meaning and moral structure of an
animal
liberation
ethic
is
fairly
straightforward:
it focuses on
the
absence of morally relevant differences
between humans and animals, and on
the moral significance of animal pain
and suffering. 1
But the form of an
environmental ethic is not so clear.
Does an environmental ethic advocate
moral concern for natural individuals,
for species I for ecosystems, or per
haps for nature as a whole? An ans
wer
to
this
question
is
required
before one can judge the relationship
between animal liberation and environ
mental ethics, but an answer', unfor
tunately, is not easily discernible.
In
what follows I will argue, first, that
several versions of an envi ronmental
ethic yield problematic environmental
and moral conclusions; second, that
an environmental ethic must be inter
preted as a complex balancing of dif
ferent kinds of moral concern-i.e.,
moral
concern
for
individuals,
for
species,
and . for
natu ral
ecosys
tems-and th i rd,
that this balanci ng
will pr"oduce moral results that are
troubling to the advocate of an animal
I ibet"ation eth ic.
An analysis of the form of an envi
ronmental ethic can proceed most eas
ily if the potential objects for moral
concern are divided into three major
groups: individuals, species, and eco
systemic
commu n ities.
Th us
one
interpretation
of
an
environmental

ethic will hold that moral obligations,
duties, or rules are applicable to all
natural
individuals-animals,
plants,
bodies of water, soil, rocks, minerals,
etc.
Another interpretation of an
environmental ethic will consider natu
ral species as the proper object of
moral concern.
A final interpretation
of an environmental ethic will hold
that moral concepts are appl icable to
ecosystems or natural communities as a
whole.
Restricting the discussion to
these possibilities will greatly facilitate
the analysis, and the cost in terms of
conceptual clarity will not be signifi
cant.
The form of an environmental
ethic that considers
obligations
to
natu re as a whole, for example, can
easily be assimilated into the ecosys
temic interpretation, once one consid
ers the earth's biosphere as one large
and complex ecosystemic commu n ity.
In analyzing the meaning and form
of an environmental ethic, two central
points need to be considered.
Fi rst,
is the formal structu re of the eth ic
coherent, reasonable, and in general
agreement with normal ethical prac
tice?
Of
course an
environmental
ethic is different from traditional ethi
cal theories that consider only human
actions, concerns, and institutions the
primary objects of moral
value-but
nonetheless,
an envi ronmental
eth ic
cannot be so radically different hom
tr'ad itional
eth ical
theories
that
it
defies cl'edibility.
It must be a plau
sible revision in the meaning and jus
tification of moral concepts.
Second,
the interpretation of an envi ronmental
ethic must be in accord with the gen
eral policies of environmentalism, i.e.,
of envi ronmental protection.
Although
it might seem strange to cite this as a
significant
consideration
in
the
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analysis
of
an
environmental
ethic-isn't it obvious that an environ
mental ethic is in accord with a policy
of environmentalism?-the fact is that
certain interpretations of the meaning
of an envi ronmental eth ic actually
undermine environmentalist principles.
These interpretations of an environ
mental ethic will thus be rejected on
the practical ground that they fail to
achieve the goal of envi ,"onmental pro
tection.
II
Perhaps the most obvious interpre
tation of an environmental ethic is the
moral consideration of the ecosystem,
or the natural community as a whole.
Aldo Leopold's oft-quoted definition of
the moral rightness of human environ
mental action is generally used as a
thematic signpost for this position: "A
thing is right when it tends to pre
serve the integrity, stability, and
beauty of the biotic community.
It is
wrong when it tends otherwise. "2 In
the more recent literature, J. Baird
Callicott and Don Marietta, Jr., have
each argued for this model of an
environmental
ethic.
Callicott
de
scribes Leopold's vision in this way:
"the good of the biotic community is
the ultimate measure of the moral
value, the rightness or wrongness, of
actions. "
Or in other words: "the
effect upon ecological systems is the
decisive factor in the determination of
the ethical quality of actions." 3 Simi
larly, Marietta writes that "morally
acceptable treatment of the environ
ment is that which does not upset the
integrity of the ecosystem as it is
seen in a diversity of life forms exist
ing in a dynamic and complex but sta
ble interdependency. "4 Thus, in this
version of an environmental ethic, the
natural ecosystem or community is the
prima ry object of moral concern. The
morality of human deliberative action
will be judged by various criteria of

ecosystemic
goodness-the
stability,
integrity, health, and diversity of the
natur"al
biotic community.
Actions
which affect an ecosystem as a whole
e.g., the damming of a river, the
clearing of forest land, the draining
of a marsh-will be morally judged by
thei I' relation to ecological concepts
concerning the entire natural commu
nity
under
consideration.
Even
actions di rected towa rds
individual
natural entities will be judged by eco
systemic criteria: shooting a deer or
chopping down a single tree will be
morally evaluated by the effect the
action has on the natural community.
A number of comments can be made
about this interpretation of an envi
ronmental ethic.
First, it is clear
that this model of moral concern in an
environmental ethic is incompatible, as
such, with an ethic of animal libera
tion. An ethic which evaluates action
in terms of communal health and sta
bility cannot be seriously interested in
the welfare of individual entities-such
as animals-unless these individuals are
particularly
important to
communal
functions.
As
Bryan
Norton
has
recently argued, "the relationship be
tween
the
individual
interests
of
organisms,
individual
plants,
and
nonliving objects, on the one hand,
and
the
healthy
functioning
and
integrity of the ecosystem, on the
other hand, is a contingent one. "5
The overall healthy functioning of the
natural community may require the
death, destruction, or suffering of
individual
natural
entities,
animals
included. From the perspective of the
natu ral commu n ity, the sacrifice of
individual entities may be the morally
correct course of action.
Callicott
thus argues that a major thesis of an
animal liberation ethic-the moral sig
nificance of the suffering of animals-is
irrelevant in the moral evaluations of
an ecosystemic envi ronmental eth ic.
"Pain and pleasure seem to have noth
ing at all to do with good and evil if
our appraisal is
taken from
the
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vantage point of ecological biology . .
If natu re as a whole is good, then
pain and death are also good. "6
Or
rather, if the well-being of the natu
ral community or ecosystem is the pri
mary good of moral judgment, then
pain and death that contributes to
this overall good cannot be judged as
a moral evil, as an animal liberation
ethic would require.
Because an ani
mal liberation ethic is concerned with
the
welfare
of
individual
animals,
while a community-based environmental
ethic may
requi re the sacrifice of
individual animals,
the two ethical
systems cannot be compatible.
The second point to notice about
the interpretation of an environmental
ethic that focuses on the natural com
munity is that it may also require the
suffering or death of human individu
als.
The attempt to determine the
moral worth of animals in a system of
environmental
ethics
includes
the
determi nation of the moral worth of
human bei ngs.
Callicott, agai n, notes
that in an environmental ethic "the
moral worth of individuals (including,
n. b., human individuals) is relative,
to be assessed in accordance with the
particular relation of each to the col
lective entity," i.e., the natural com
munity.7 Thus, humans are not to be
given their traditionally special moral
status
based
on
rationality,
moral
autonomy,
or
whatever.
Instead,
human individuals, just as all other
natural entities, will be morally evalu
ated by thei I' contribution to the wel
fare, the healthy functioning, of the
natural community.
This revision of
the traditional lofty moral status of
human individuals is a source of seri
ous
criticism
of
an
environmental
ethic.
Why,
it might be argued,
should humans accept a system of
moral rules that may require harmful
consequences to human individuals or
human projects and institutions?
One
need only consider the existence of
species-osuch as the smallpox virus or
disease-bea ri ng
mosqu itoes- wh ich
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threaten human individuals.
Must the
species still be protected at the cost
of human life?
It does no good to
respond to this criticism by arguing
that in the long run restricting human
activity or sacrifici ng human individu
as for the protection of the natural
community will benefit human society.
Although this is a popular argument
of many environmentalists, it is only a
contingent possibi lity.1 ndeed, a dif
ferent point seems
more probable:
since the primary goal of moral action
is the good of the natural community,
and since human technology and pop
u lation growth create many of the
th reats to envi ronmental health,
an
envi ronmental ethic may demand the
elimination of much of the human race
and human civilization.
This consid
eration casts serious doubts on the
plausibility of the environmental ethic
based on the welfare of the natu ral
community as a whole.
The
only
possible
method
of
defending an environmental ethic from
this criticism is to insist that human
life and institutions are part of the
natural community whose good is the
primary end of all action.
Human
flourishing is important because it is
an essential component of the natural
commu n ity.
An
erwi ronmental eth ic
that excluded humans from the natural
community would clearly threaten the
continuation of all human projects and
activities-whatever' humans did would
have an adverse effect on the moral
unit,
the natural
community.
An
environmental
ethic
that
excluded
humans from the natural community,
for example, would prohibit humans
from filling in a small marsh area in
order to expand a pre-existing hous
i ng development on its border.
But
an environmental ethic that considers
human well-being as part of the natu
ral community (not, of course, the
supreme part), as part of the moral
end
of
action,
might
permit
the
expansion of the housing development
after a cornpar'ison of the benefits and
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harms to the human population and
the natural environment (the marsh).
At
best,
however,
including
humans in the natural community is
only a partial deflection of the criti
cism of an environmental ethic based
on its anti-human tendencies.
An
environmental ethic with an appropri
ate
perspective on the
place of
humanity in the natural system will
save a few human projects and activi
ties, but it will still require major
changes
in
human
activity,
major
human sacrifices for the sake of the
overall
community.
Unfortunately,
specifyi ng these changes and sacri
fices by means of concrete examples is
a
difficult-and
perhaps
impossi
ble-task. The making of environmen
tal decisions is not a job for the arm
chair
philosopher:
a
proper
en
vironmental
decision
requires
a
multitude of scientific and sociological
data as a factual basis. Nevertheless,
even if humans are included in the
natural community so that their inter
ests are taken into account in the
determination of communal well-being,
it should be clear that dumping toxic
pollutants into a lake-a lake that is
not used
in any other
way by
humans-would be a moral evil, an
injury to the natural environment.
Whether humans would be permitted to
dam a river for electrical power is a
more problematic case, since the harm
to the natu ral envi ronment as a whole
is less severe; in this kind of case
specific facts would be needed to make
the moral determination.
The crucial
point to remember is that this form of
an environmental ethic claims that
humans are no different than any
other species; the measure of their
worth and the worth of thei r activities
is decided by the overall well-being of
the natural community.
If I plan to
dig a well on my property in the
country I will have to consider· the
effect of my drawing water not only
on my human neighbors and their
water supplies,
but also
on the
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surrounding countryside and its non
human inhabitants.
An envi ronmental
ethic thus requires a major revision in
traditional human moral practice.
In
an environmental ethic moral decisions
transcend inter-human relationships to
consider the natural community as a
whole.
Moral decisions cannot be
made by simply considering conse
quences to human life.
But this revi
sion in moral practice is not easily
granted; humans must relinquish their
special place in the moral universe.
Thus an environmental ethic may not
be acceptable to humans because it
implausibly revises traditional moral
practice.
A final comment concerning this
i nter'pretation
of
an
envi ronmental
ethic undermines its validity even
more.
The fact is that an environ
mental ethic that considers the overall
well-'being
well-·being of the community as the
primary goal of all action cannot
explain the moral rightness of all the
policies desired by the contemporary
environmentalist movement. . This ver
sion of an environmental ethic is una
ble to explai n the protection of ra re
and endangered species, species so
threatened that they play little or no
part· in the ecology of their natural
communities. I n this regard, Lilly
Marlene Russow cites as an example
the David deer, a species now pre
served on ly in zoos, a species whose
origi nal habitat or natu ral ecosystem
is unknown to humanity. 8
Similarly,
the snail darter or the bald eagle are
examples of species which have little
or no ecological function in their nat
ural habitats.
In a sense, then,
these species a re not members of the
natural community,
not functioning
parts of the ecological system. Their
preservation,
therefore,
cannot be
guaranteed by simply securing the
morad goal of communal or ecosystemic
well-being.
An envi ronmental ethic
designed to treat communal welfare as
the primary good cannot explain the
preservation of species so rare that
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they no longer serve an ecological
function.
But since the preservation
of ra re species is an important goal of
environmentalists, this interpretation
of an environmental ethic must be
rejected.
The problem of the role of endan
gered species in ecological communities
leads to a ~econd possible interpreta
tion of an environmental ethic: per
haps an envi ronmental eth ic is an eth
ica system that considers species as
the primary object of moral concern.
An advocate of this version' of an
environmental ethic could argue then
that
ra re and endangered species
ought to be preserved because natural
species are the primary recipients of
moral obligation. Destroying a species
wou Id be morally wrong, because it is
equivalent to the traditional prohib
ition against killing
an
individual
human being.
In addition, a species
based environmental ethic could also
explain obligations to ecological com
munities as a whole, since these com
munities contain species
of living
things or they are the habitats neces
sa ryfor the survival of species.
T his i nterp retation of an env i ronmen
tal ethic might therefore be more
,attuned to the needs of the environ
mentalist, i.e., to the protection of
rare and endangered species and the
preservation of natu ral ecological com
mu n ities and habitats.
The first point to notice about this
"species" interpretation of an environ
mental, ethic is that, like the commu
nity model, it is basically incompatible
with an animal liberation ethic.
Al
though it restricts moral concern to a
'much smaller group of entities than
the natural community, it still focuses
on a collection of entities rather than
on individuals.
Since the primary
moral goal is the well-being and sur
vival of species, the pain or death of
individual members of the species is of
secondary importance.
It may be ne
cessa ry, for example, to manage or
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"harvest" an animal specIes that IS
over'populating an area and threaten
ing its own food supply.
The death
(even if painless) of individual animals
in order to insure the continuance of
the entire species would be a moral
evil in a system of animal liberation
ethics.
I n addition, there are conceptual
problems with this interpretation of an
environmental ethic.
In a practical
sense,
the moral
consideration of
species does not provide di rect rea
sons for the protection of the nonliv
ing environmental background,
the
natural objects that form the material
~tructu re of ecosystems.
Envi ronmen
talists, for example, seek the preser
vation of beautiful natural rock forma
tions, free-flowing rivers, and un
developed wetlands.
They seek this
preservation, not simply because of
the life forms which live in and
a rou nd
these
natu ral
areas,
but
because of some direct interest in the
nonliving objects
themselves.
But
this concern for
nonliving natural
objects cannot be explained by a moral
consideration of species.
A more serious problem is the jus
tification of an envi ronmental ethic
that focuses on species as the primary
object of moral consideration.
Why
should species count so much?
Why
s hou Id species be so importa nt? Joel
Feinberg, for one, discounts species
enti I'ely as the proper objects of
direct moral concern : "A whole collec
tion, as such, cannot have beliefs,
expectations, wants, or desires
I ndividual elephants can have inter
ests, but the species elephant can
not. "9
For Feinberg, at least, an
entity without interests cannot have
moral rights or be an object of moral
consideration,
Now although I am not
suggesting agreement with Feinberg's
views, he does emphasize the oddity
of considering a whole species a mor
ally relevant entity.
Indeed, this
interpretation
of
an
environmental
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ethic has rather an ad hoc aur'a to it:
since
environmentalists
desire
the
protection of rare and endangered
species, they create an ethic that
considers species in themselves as
morally valuable.
But on what can
this moral value be based?
Either a
species is important because it fulfills
an ecological function in the natural
community, in which case the commu
nity model of an environmental ethic
will explain its preservation; or a
species is important because the indi
vidual members of the species are
valuable, in which case an individual
istic model of an environmental ethic
will explain the act of preservation. 10
I n itself, a species-based environmen
tal ethic seems· to be an uneasy,
groundless compromise
between the
broad view that the natural community
is
the
environmentally
appropriate
moral object and the narrow view that
natural individuals are themselves the
bearers of moral worth. 11
Thus one arrives at the third
interpretation
of
an
environmental
ethic:
an environmental ethic is a
system of ethical rules and obligations
pertaining to individual natural enti
ties di rectly.
Natu ral entities have
moral value in themselves,
and so
they must be protected by envi ron
mentally correct policies of action.
Human deliberative action will be mor
ally evaluated by its relationship to
the individual natural entities in the
environment.
Draining a marsh or
dammi ng a river wi II be judged by the
effects
produced on the individual
entities in these natural areas.
The
ecosystem or natural community as a
whole will be protected because the
individuals who make up the commu
nity will be protected in themselves.
At first glance, this interpretation has
much to recommend it.
It has a
structure similar to traditional moral
theories that consider human i ndividu
als the primary objects of moral con
cern.
Since natural individuals are
being considered, there is no need to
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intr'oduce peculiar' ontological ques
tions about the interests or desires of
collections or commu n ities.
Moreover,
Leopold suggests an analogy with var
ious
historical
extensions
of moral
consideration and rights to groups of
human
individuals:
blacks,
women,
children,
etc. 12
And
Christopher
Stone has argued that the legal con
cept of guardianship can be used to
provide this moral conception with a
substantive content: i. e., the consid
eration of individual natu ral entities
as the beneficiaries (in themselves) of
human action. 13
In sum, the third
interpretation
of
an
envi ronmental
ethic considers
natural entities
in
themselves, as individuals, the proper
objects of moral concern
to whom
moral ru les and obi igations apply.
As
morally valuable entities they deserve·
protection and preservation.
Several comments can also be made
about this version of an environmental
ethic.
First,
it is clear that this
environmental ethic is the most similar
to an ethic dealing with the moral sta
tus of animals.
An animal liberation
ethic considers the moral worth of
animals in themselves as individuals;
this individualistic environmental ethic
considers the moral worth of all natu
ral
entities.
An
animal
liberation
ethic considers as morally relevant
certain
properties
of
the
animals
themselves-e. g., sentience-rather than
merely the relationship the· animals
have to morally "superior" autonomous
humans.
Animals have intrinsic or
inherent value based ·on some aspect
of thei r existence and not simply an
instrumental value for humans.
Simi
larly, an individualistic environmental
ethic considers
natural
entities as
inherently valuable because of some
objective property they possess in
themselves; they a re not val uable sim
ply
because of
their
instrumental
value to human society and human
interests. 14
Thus an envi ronmental
ethic conceived on the model of indi
vidual rights or moral consideration
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for natu ral objects is most simi la I' to
an animal liberation ethic; the two
ethical theories have identical formal
structu res.
But there are problems with this
version of an environmental ethic. As
with the species-based interpretation
of an environmental ethic, the problem
ofiustification proves to be insolv
able.
If one grants that an environ
mental ethic must find some objective
property of natural entities as the
source of intrinsic moral value, then
one is hard pressed to discover a
coherent
and
plausible
candidate.
Clearly, the criterion most often cho
sen by advocates of an animal libera
tion ethic, sentience or the ability to
feel pleasure and pain,
is largely
irrelevant to an ethic that considers
. the moral significance of plants and
other natu ra I entities that do not feel
pain and pleasure.
Kenneth Good
paster has thus argued for the moral
considerability of all living entities,
and he makes a powerful case in that
he does not a rgue for the moral
equivalence of all such living be
i ngs. 15 Nevertheless, a reverence for
all life criterion cannot justify an
environmental ethic.
Even assuming
that a non-arbitrary or unbiased scale
of moral worth could be developed to
show when it was morally acceptable
to ki II other forms of life (Goodpaster,
e.g., postpones this extremely diffi
cult task), the ethical consideration of
all living entities does not extend the
moral boundaries far enough.
An
envir-onmental ethic that is true to the
principles of environmentalism must be
able to explain the moral consideration
of nonliving natural entities as well as
living ones.
An envi ronmental ethic
that considers the moral worth of all
natu ral entities is considering rocks,
bodies of water, and the shifting
sands of a beach to be morally con
siderable.
This moral consideration
cannot be based on the moral criterion
of life, since these natural entities are
not alive.
On what, then, can the
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moral consideration be based?
It is at this juncture that one
begins to question the entire plan of
finding a morally relevant property of
all natural objects as the basis of an
environmental ethic.
As even Good
paster discovers, in a revision of his
earlier views, the extension of moral
consideration beyond humans reaches
a "breaking point" where talk of mor
ally relevant interests and properties
seems
highly
implausible. 16
The
brea ki ng poi nt, of cou rse, is the
moral consideration of inanimate natu
ral objects. Can rocks or streams be
morally considerable? Unless one pos
tulates an ethical doctrine of the
sacredness of all nature, there does
not seem to be any method of justify
ing the moral worth of individual non
living natural entities. But a doctrine
of the sacredness of all nature is
highly problematic.
Does it mean, for
example, that disease organisms or
disease-carrying insects
cannot be
exterminated?
What about domesti
cated animals and plants?
Do these
require an additiona·1 moral principle?
Basically, the idea that an individual
natu ral non Iiving entity has in he rent
moral worth is too implausible to be
seriously considered.
Although one
may wish to develop a theory that will
protect all animals and plants, a moral
criterion based on all of natural exis
tence is so broad that it excludes vir
tually nothing.
The problem with inanimate natural
entities forces a retu rn to a commu
n ity or ecosystemic approach to an
environmental ethic. Only if nonliving
natural entities are considered as eco
logically significant parts of a natural
community
can
they
be
plausibly
judged as morally worthwhile.
They
do not possess intrinsic or inherent
value as such, but as functioning
parts of a morally valued natural com
mu n ity.
The
analysi s
has
th us
returned to its starting point, and
with disappointing results:· all of the
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interpretations of an environ men tal
ethic considered so far prove to be
problematic.
III
Despite the problems encou ntered
ill all three of the interpretations of
an environmental ethic, it may be fea
sible to attempt some kind of compro
mise or combination of the various
alternatives.
Perhaps a blending of
the differing interpretations will yield
an environmental ethic that combines
the strong points of each version and
avoids the implausibilities and areas of
contention and criticism. Therefore, I
would like to suggest the following
version of an envi ronmental eth ic, as
an outline of a comprehensive and
plausible system of ethics to insure
the protection of the natural environ
ment.
A meaningful and practical envi
ronmental ethic must be composed of
two principles or two kinds of moral
consideration.
The primary form of
moral
consideration
is
the
moral
regard for the ecosystem or the natu
ral community, as discussed above as
the first interpretation of an environ
mental ethic.
This must be the pri
mary principle of an environmental
ethic because envi ronmental protection
means more than just the protection of
natural individuals and natur"al spec
ies-it means the protection of complete
ecological systems.
Envi ronmental ists
and wilderness preservationists (for
example) are interested in protecting
environments, i. e., ecological systems
and natural communities. The preser
vation of individual natu ral entities or
natural species in isolation from their
natural habitats and communities is at
best a last ditch effort to prevent
extinction; it cannot be the primary
goal of a policy of environmentalism.
Thus the preeminent goal of action in
a theory of environmental ethics is the

well-being, health, or stability of the
ecological community.
Moral I'ules,
obligations, and duties, or the moral
evaluation of consequences of action,
will be developed and determined by a
concept of the ecological good, i. e. ,
the good for the ecological community
as a whole.
Nonetheless, this primary goa! of
ecosystemic well-being. must be aug
mentE~d by
a secondary goal of the
protection
of
natu ral
individuals.
This secondary goal will serve to limit
the excessive use of the primary
principle in cases where it should not
apply. What I have in mind are cases
such as the rare endangered species
that is no longer a functioning part of
the natu ral ecosystem, or even disease
organ isms such as the smallpox vi rus
that are on the verge of being totally
eradicated.
If ecosystemic well-being
were the only principle of moral
action, then it would seem permissible
to eliminate the disease organisms or
to let the endangered species become
extinct. But if an environmental ethic
has a secondary moral principle which
is activated, so to speak, after ques
tions of ecosystemic well-being are
decided, then rare and endangered
species can be protected despite their
irrelevance to ecosystemic health and
stability.
Thus in cases where the
health or welfare of the natural com
munity is not at issue, human action
affecting the envi ronment shou Id be
judged by its relationship to natural
individuals and species.
As long as
they do not adversely affect the
well-being of the natural ecological
community, all individuals and species
ought to be preserved and protected.
This is the second and subsidiary
principle of a practical environmental
ethic.
At the risk of repeating myself, let
me be a bit more specific about the
ordering of these two principles. The
primary principle must be the moral
consideration of natural communities as

82
a whole, for this is the only method
of protecting envi ronmental systems
and the
inanimate and
non sentient
components of these systems.
If, on
the contrary, the moral consideration
of natural individuals was primary,
then a coherent and plausible expla
nation for the protection of inanimate
natural objects would have to be given
to insure the basic tenets of environ
mental policy.
But it is not at all
ciear what theory of value could show
how inanimate natural entities-stones
and streams-are inherently valuable.
It seems that only as parts of an eco
logically healthy well-functioning com
munity (that is itself valuable) do
these inanimate and non sentient enti
ties become valuable.
Moreover,
if
the consideration of natural individu
als was primary, it is not obvious how
or why one would protect ecological
systems or communities.
As long as
the individual animals,
e.g.,
were
hea Ithy, there wou Id be no need to
protect thei r natu ral habitats.
One
could create articifial habitats-parks
and preserves-that would maintain the
well-being of the individual animals
but would not, of course, be consis:'
tent with environmentalist principles
of preservation.
Thus, I have sug
gested that the moral consideration of
ecosystemic communities is the moral
principle most compatible with envi
ronmental
policies;
augmenting this
principle with a secondary concern for
natural individuals-e.g., endangered
species of animals-will yield a complete
environmental ethic that is plausible
and in agreement with environmentalist
i ntu ition s .
Although
this
ordering
of
two
kinds of moral consideration for' the
envi ronment-i. e.,
consideration
for
the natural ecosystemic community and
consideration for natural individuals
and
species-yields a fai rly
precise
practical system of moral action and
evaluation, it is not without its hard
cases.
Perhaps the most intriguing is
the case in which the existence of a
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particular
species
(or
individual)
actually threatens the natural commu
nity as a whole.
Despite environmen
talist beliefs about the preservation of
species, the use of the two principles
in this type of case requires the elim
ination of the th reateni ng
species.
Since the primary principle of an
envi ronmental ethic, the primary goal
of all action relating to the environ
ment, is the health,
stability, and
well-being of the entire natural com
munity, the community must be pro
tected from the threat.
Of course it
is likely that in an actual instance the
well-being of the ecosystem could be
preserved by transfering the species
. to a different ecosystem where
it
wou Id not be ha rmful, or by control
ling the size of the species popula
tion;
nevertheless,
if
ecosystemic
health or stability requires the elimi
nation of the species, the species
must be eliminated.
If an environ
mental ethic permitted the destruction
of natu ral envi ronments, natu ral eco
systems and communities, it would be
meaningless or incoherent.
I n sum, then,
an envi ronmental
ethic should be interpreted as a com
plex balancing of two forms of moral
consideration regarding natural enti
ties and systems.
Moral cons idet'ation
should first be directed toward the
natural community or ecosystem as a
whole, so that the overall good for
the ecosystem is the prima ry goal of
action.
But
this
communal
good
should be supplemented by a consid
eration
of natural
individuals
and
species, so that incases where eco
systemic well-being is not an issue,
the protection of endangered species
or natural individuals can be morally
justified.
This supplementary or sec
ondary moral consideration of individ
ua I s wi II yield a much richer envi ron
mental
ethic
than
the
mere
con
sideration of ecosystemic good, and it
will help avoid the objections to the
first
community-based
environmental
eth ic discussed above.
Augmented by
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a seconda ry consideration of natu ral
individuals, this theory will be able to
explain the protection of rare endan
gered species that
a re
no longer
functioning members of a natu ral com
munity.
It will also help to soften the
revolutionary character of an environ
mental ethic that considers the eco
systemic good superior to the good· of
human
individuals;
because of the
secondary principle natural individuals
(including
humans)
will
not
be
excluded from direct moral considera
tion.
Thus, the balancing of these
two kinds of moral consideration yields
the most plausible and practical envi
t'onmental
ethic,
an
envi ronmental
ethic that is essentially in accord with
environmentalist intuitions about the
protection of the natu ral envi ronment,
and that is reasonable enough to be
accepted by human moral agents.

IV
Finally, then, a comment on the
relationship between this environmen
tal
ethic and an
animal
liberation
ethic.
It should be clear that if the
primary ethical goal or principle of an
environmental ethic is the well-being
of the ecosystemic natu ral commun ity
as a whole, then the well- bei ng of
individual animals in the community
will sometimes be sacrified for the
commu nal good. 17
The problem is
that
ecosystems
fu nction,
develop,
and survive by means of the life and
death struggle of competi ng natu ral
forces,
competing
living
beings.
Humans cannot act to prevent the
suffering and death of all animal life
and remain true to an environmental
ethic.
Indeed, there may be times
when human action to improve the
health of the ecosystemic community
will require the death, destruction, or
suffering of individual animals or ani
mal species.
Humans may have to
eliminate disease organisms, insects,
or even higher an imals-rabbits, deer,

or wolves, e.g.-which have overpopu
lated their natural communities and
th reaten ecosystemic stability.
But an
animal liberation ethic holds that the
death and suffering of animals is a
moral evil,
because it violates the
moral worth of
individual. animals.
When this death and suffering is a
resu It of human action, even· for the
sake of ecosystemic well-being, it is a
direct violation of the principles of an
animal liberation ethic.
Thus, as I
noted above, an animal liberation ethic
and an enviromental ethic based on
the good of the ecosystemic natu ral
community will tend to be incompati
ble.
The advocate of an envi ronmental
ethic: has, I believe, only. one method
for removing this incompatibility: a
revision of the basic structu re of an
envi ronmental ethic.
An envi romental
ethic can be made compatible with an
animal liberation ethic if it is con
ceived as an ethic primarily concerned
with
the
satisfaction
of
sentient
beings-the higher animals and
hu
mans.
Natural entities and ecological
communities would be preserved, not
because of any intrinsic value, but
simply because they provide satisfac
tion or pleasu re to sentient beings.
But this model of an environmental
ethic will not operate as a preserver
of environmentalist policies; it makes
an environmental ethic compatible with
. an animal liberation ethic by destroy
i ng the essence and the practical
application of the environmental ethic.
The fact is that the existence of any
natural entity or ecological system is
only contingently related to the satis
factions of sentient bei ngs.
An imals
can survive and flourish in habitats
that are not their natural
homes.
Humans, of cou rse,
have developed
such a multiplicity of artifical enjoy
ments that there is no real need for
the pleasures of the natural world. 18
Now I am not arguing that humans
receive no pleasu re from the natu ral
environment; my point is that this
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pleasu re is on ly conti ngently I'elated
to the existence of the natural envi
ronment.
If the natural environment
is only protected, e.g., because it
provides humans with aesthetic and
recreational
satisfactions,
then
if
human interests in aesthetics and rec
reational activities change (as they
seem to be in this increasingly artifi
cal and technologicai world) there will
be no reason to protect the natu ral
environment. 19 The interests of sen
tient beings cannot provide a secure
basis for environmental policies, and
thus they cannot be the primary prin
ciple of an environmental ethic.
The
contingent relationship between the
ex istence of the natu ral envi ronment
and the satisfaction or interests of
sentient beings prl:!vl:!ntsthe merger
of an animal liberation ethic and an
environmental ethic.
Because an ani
mal liberation ethic only requires the
consideration of sentient life, while an
environmental ethic requires the pres
ervation of non sentient entities and
systems as well as sentient life, the
two systems are basically incompatible.
However,
a
n umber of factors
serve to modify this bleak picture.
First, the environmental ethic here
proposed is not based solely on the
good of the ecological community as a
whole; there is a secondary principle
which bases moral evaluation on the
good of individual natural entities,
including sentient animals.
As long
as the welfare of the community is not
at stake,
individual
natural enti
ties-including animals-must be pro
tected.
Because I have a rgued for a
balanced set of principles as the
structure of an environmental ethic, it
is possible to save much of an animal
liber'ation ethic.
I ndividual animals
(or species of animals) cannot be
harmed, unless there is an overriding
and serious need on the pa rt of the
entire natural community.
A second factor is the problem of
domesticated an imals. Advocates of an
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animal liberation ethic,
of course,
seek many practical changes in human
action affecting domesticated animals.
Now Callicott, for one, finds this con
cern to be almost incoherent from the
perspective of an envi ronmental eth ic.
Since domesticated livestock are a
human artifact, their effects on the
natural environment should be judged
as any other human artifact. 20 Sheep
g razi ng ina meadow, for example,
may do as much ha rm to the natu ral
cycles of the region's plant life as the
dumping of toxic chemicals.
From
Callicott's ecological perspective, the
fact that the sheep are animals rather
than the instruments of human delib
erative action would not justify or
excuse the harm done to the natural
environment. But I do not think that
the advocate of an envi ronmental eth ic
needs to worry about domesticated
animals causing ecological damage. At
worst, domesticated animals, because
they are not part of the natural com
munity, are simply an irrelevancy
from the standpoint of an environmen
tal ethic. Sheep, for example, do not
generally graze in natural wilderness
areas, but in pasture land that has
al ready
been
itself
domesticated.
Thei r effect on
natu ral ecological
cycles is minimal. 21 At best, using a
two-pri nciple
envi ronmenta I
eth ic,
humans are able to judge the pain and
suffering and moral worth of individ
ual domesticated animals as morally
significant; as long as questions of
environmental health or well-being are
not involved, then even domesticated
animals can be treated as objects of
moral concern.
Finally, it is important to realize
that in practical terms, a more envi
ronmentally appropriate human social
policy will gr-eatly benefit animal life.
Although from the perspective of eco
logical theory it may be necessa ry to
sacrifice some animals for the ecologi
cal well-being of the natural commu
nity, in actual practice more animals
are harmed by human actions that
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violate ecological
principles.
More
animals
are
harmed
by
humans
destroying and degrading ecological
communities than by humans attempt
attempt
ing to improve them. Adopting prin
prin
ciples of an enviromental ethic should,

in the long run, benefit the lives of
animals, for humans will begin to rec
rec
ognize all natural entities as members
of a morally relevant natural commu
commu
nity.
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mals, as such, is not a subject area
of envi ronmenta I eth ics. Of cou rse if
domesticated animals begin to intrude
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then
they
would
be
treated like any other human artifact
(machines,
chemicals,
etc.)
that
harmed the environment.
Or if a
human began to kill wild natural ani
mals
in
order
to
protect
his
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domesticated sheep he would be vio
violating an environmental ethic, just as
if he polluted a stream to "protect"
his recreational
pleasure in
speedspeed
boating.
But the vast majority of
cases
involving
domesticated
aniani
mals-the morality of factory farming,
for example--are in a realm of substan
substantive ethics completely removed fr'om
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the concerns of an environmental
ethic.
The question of the compati
compatibility or incompatibility of an environ
environmental ethic and an animal liberation
ethic when dealing with the treatment
of domesticated animals as such is
th us unanswerable and misconceived:
these are simply two different subject
matters.

